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Executive summary 
 This study explores possible gender-specific inclinations, specifically inclinations for 
cooperation, fairness, discrimination, risk taking and sex stereotyping, all potentially 
fundamental to negotiation outcomes. The aim is that the findings may provide insight in 
observed gender inequality in organizational life. Participants in the study were engaged in 
matrix games with a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like payoff structure, but with variable degrees of 
possible cooperation. The games were played with the strategy method and all participants 
played against both women and men. The results showed no significant differences in level of 
cooperation between the sexes. Neither were there any significant differences in fairness or 
discrimination of or by either sex in the games. However, men were found to be more prone 
to taking risks compared to women, and both female- and male participants believed that men 
would take higher risks in the games. Differences in risk propensity may help explain why 
men do better in negotiations in organizational life, as men would be more inclined than 
women to enter risky negotiations and taking risks in negotiations. Thus policies aimed at 
lowering the risk of becoming unemployed, paired with policies to lower the risk of initiating 
salary negotiations, could potentially contribute to increased gender equality in organizational 
life. 
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1. Introduction  
 Through negotiation, two or more agents can structure economic and social contracts 
and transactions, and resolve conflicts. Without the calculated possibility of creating value, at 
least for herself, no rational economic agent would enter a negotiation. Thus, negotiation can 
be described as a means for agents, on an individual as well as on an aggregated level, to 
acquire material and/or non-material resources, with status and power being the most 
prominent. In organizational life, women have less access to resources than men do. The 
wage gap and the glass ceiling phenomena are ample evidence of this (Gerhart & Rynes, 
1991; Wood, Corcoran & Courant, 1993). ,  To create an understanding of what is causing 1 2
these phenomena, it could potentially help to analyze how women and men behave in 
negotiations. If there are significant gender differences in negotiation behavior, then 
knowledge of the respective behavior could serve as a basis for gender equalizing corporate 
and governmental policy. 
 This study is meant to complement the numerous, but mostly non-conclusive, studies 
on the effect of gender in negotiations. The goal of this research is to explore if gender 
differences exist in negotiation behavior and explain the underlying traits of the differences if 
they do, in fact, exist. Specifically, this research will explore the existence of: (a) a gender-
linked propensity to cooperate; (b) a gender-linked propensity for fairness; (c) a gender-
linked propensity to discriminate; (d) a gender-linked propensity for risk; and (e) a gender-
linked propensity for sex stereotyping. The complex nature and the broad definition of 
negotiations make it highly difficult to accurately reproduce such interactions in a single, 
quantitative experiment. On the other hand, observing case negotiations or real-life 
negotiations is a time consuming alternative, and variables other than gender would possibly 
pose interference to the research. The method chosen in this research, is a complimentary 
study that aims to capture the above specified aspects of negotiations, through a quantitative 
experiment building on findings from previous research, in order to give a more complete 
picture of the subject.  
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 Gerhart, B, & Rynes, S. (1991). Determinants and consequences of salary negotiations by male and female 1
MBA graduates.
 Wood, R. G., Corcoran M. E. & Courant, P. N. (1993). Pay Differences among the Highly Paid: The Male-2
Female Earnings Gap in Lawyers’ Salaries.
 The experiment in this study is a matrix game played with the strategy method 
(Selten, 1967), influenced by a Public Goods experiment (Fichbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2000) 
but now played with two players instead of four. ,  This way, the game holds the same 3 4
strategic structure as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but with variable degrees of cooperation. The 
decision situations in the game were framed as an investment and structured so that all, in 
economic terms, perfectly rational and selfish players were predicted to make zero 
investments according to standard theory. The experiment was meant to capture the more 
complex nature of integrative negotiations regarding fairness, discrimination, risks and 
voluntary concessions to a common project with an uncertain yield. It was not meant to elicit 
negotiation effectiveness. Previous gender studies on the subject concern the distributive 
bargain aspect of negotiations and are mostly conducted with Ultimatum and Dictator games, 
with no possibility to enlarge the pie.  These previous approaches are in themselves more 5
competitive than collaborative. The possible mutual benefit from cooperation, the prospect of 
enlarging the pie, is captured in this experiment as the option to invest in a common project. 
 Evidence from previous research on cooperativeness and sex differences (see for 
example Eagly & Johnson, 1990, and Walters et al, 1998), studies on fairness preferences 
(see for example Rabin, 1993, and Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001) studies on discrimination in 
negotiations (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999, and Holm, 1998) studies on risk attitudes (see 
for example Eckel et al, 2008), and studies on gender stereotypes (see for example Matheson, 
1991, and Watson, 1994), suggest that women are more cooperative and fair than men, that 
both sexes discriminate against women, that women are less prone to risks than men, and that 
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 Selten, (1967). Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen 3
eines Oligopolexperiments.
 Fehr, E., Fishbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2000). Are People Conditional Cooperative? Evidence from a Public 4
Goods Experiment
 Walters, A., Stuhlmacher, A. S, & Meyer, L. L., (1998). Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: 5
A Meta-analysis. 
men are believed to be more prone to risks compared to women. , , , , , , , ,  It is thus 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
predicted that the experiment will show that women behave more cooperatively than men 
(hypothesis 1), that women are more egalitarian than men (hypothesis 2), that women are 
discriminated against to a higher extent than men (hypothesis 3), that women are less prone 
to risks than men (hypothesis 4), and that men are believed to be more prone to risks 
compared to women (hypothesis 5).  
 The results showed that:  
• There were no significant differences in level of cooperation between the sexes.  
• There were no significant differences in fairness between the sexes. 
• There was no significant discrimination of or by either sex. 
• Men were significantly more prone to taking risks compared to women, when cooperating 
with either of the sexes. 
• Both female- and male participants believed that men would be more prone to taking risks 
than women. 
 Section 2 provides the results of previous research and links to this study; section 3 
offers a theoretical explanation of the experiment and this research; section 4 presents the 
data used in the experiment; section 5 describes the method of the experiment; section 6 
details the results; and section 7 discusses the results and presents conclusions from the 
research. 
!
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analysis
 Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics.8
 Andreoni, J. & Vesterlund, L. (2001). Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism.9
 Matheson, K. (1991). Social cues in computer-mediated negotiations: Gender makes a difference.10
 Watson, C. (1994). Gender versus power as a predictor of negotiation behavior and outcomes.11
 Solnick, S.J., Schweitzer, M. E., (1999). The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum 12
Game Decisions.
 Holm, H. J., (2000). Gender-Based Focal Points13
 Eckel, C., Oliveira, A. C. M. & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Gender and Negotiation in the Small: Are Women 14
(Perceived to Be) More Cooperative than Men?
2. Previous research  
 A substantial amount of studies have aimed to explain gender differences in 
negotiations. Although the results are inconclusive, a majority of the studies found women 
slightly less competitive and more cooperative than men. However, no clear, definite 
conclusions have been made on gender differences in the underlying behavioral traits that 
determine the outcome of negotiations. Gender differences in propensity for: cooperation, 
fairness, discrimination, risk taking and sex stereotyping, traits that are fundamentally 
determining factors to the outcome of negotiations, have not been rigorously explored. These 
behavioral traits are thus also fundamental to the understanding of the observed differences in 
outcome of negotiations in organizational life.  
!
2.1 Cooperativeness   
 The findings of previous literature are quite inconsistent. Some studies have found 
women to be less cooperative negotiators than men (e.g. Oskamp & Pearlman, 1965; Bedell 
and Sistrunk, 1973; Hottes & Kahn, 1974), whiles other literature has found women more 
cooperative than men (e.g., Fisher & Smith, 1969; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Lindskold, 1970; 
Conrath, 1972; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Scudder, 
1988). , , , , , , ,  Two meta-analyses of gender and cooperativeness from the 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
mid-1970s found that most studies concluded that women are more cooperative than men, but 
a large portion of the studies analyzed drew the opposite conclusion (Maccoby and Jacklin, 
1974; Rubin and Brown, 1975). Some studies did not find any significant behavioral 
!8
 Oskamp, S., & Perlman, D. (1965). Factors affecting cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.15
 Bedell, J., & Sistrunk, F. (1973). Power, opportunity costs, and sex in a mixed-motive game.16
 Hottes, J. H., & Kahn, A. (1974). Sex differences in a mixed-motive conflict situation. 17
 Fisher, R., & Smith, W. P. (1969). Conflict of interest and attraction in the development of cooperation.18
 Tedeschi, J. T., Bonoma, T., & Lindskold, S. (1970). Threateners’ reactions to prior announcement of 19
behavioral compliance or defiance.
 Conrath, D. W. (1972). Sex role and “cooperation” in the game of chicken.20
 Kimmel, M. J., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J. M., Konar-Goldband, E. K. (1980). Effects of trust, aspiration, and 21
gender on negotiation tactics.
 Scudder, J. N. (1988). The influence of power on powerful speech: A social-exchange perspective.22
difference on the subject (Ferguson & Schmitt, 1988; Grant & Sermat, 1969; Horai & 
Tedeschi, 1975; Watson & Hoffman, 1996). , , , , ,  23 24 25 26 27 28
 Whatson (1994) and Camras (1994) both support the notion of a more competitive 
man and suggest that this is due to gender-role socialization. ,  Camras (1994) support the 29 30
claim with the finding that when kids advance in age, they use more gender-typical 
negotiation strategies.  Rubin and Brown (1975) and Tannen (1995) argue according to the 31
same line of thought, when giving an interpretation of the heterogeneous results found in 
research on gender and competitiveness. Men are suggested to be less interpersonal-oriented 
and more goal-oriented than women. This suggests that men are more competitive bargainers 
than women when a competitive approach is more profitable. ,  In a review of previous 32 33
studies, the researchers found that a significant portion of the research that pointed to females 
being the more competitive gender were constructed under conditions where a competitive 
approach would most likely not maximize profit. More recent, and perhaps the most 
extensive, research on gender and negotiator cooperativeness is a meta-analysis from 1998 
(Walters et al 1998).  The meta-analytic review, including results from 62 research reports, 34
measured the relative gender-competitiveness behavior. Women showed a slight inclination to 
behave more cooperatively than men. However, in a strategic environment where the 
opponent played “tit-for-tat” (copying behavior, where the player cooperates if the opponent 
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 Maccoby, Eleanor E.; Jacklin, Carol N. (1974). The psychology of sex differences 23
 Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation24
 Ferguson, E. D.,&Schmitt, S. (1988). Gender-linked stereotypes and motivation affect performance in the 25
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
 Grant, M. J., & Sermat, V. (1969). Status and sex of other as determinants of behavior in a mixed motive 26
game.
 Horai, J., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1975). Compliance and the use of threats and promises after a power reversal.27
 Watson, C., & Hoffman, L. R. (1996). Managers as negotiators: A test of power versus gender as predictors of 28
feelings, behavior, and outcomes.
 Watson, C. (1994). Gender versus power as a predictor of negotiation behavior and outcomes.29
 Camras, L. A. (1984). Children’s verbal and nonverbal communication in a conflict situation.30
 Ibid.31
 Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation.32
 Tannen, D. (1990). You just don’t understand: Women and men in conversation. 33
 Walters, A., Stuhlmacher, A. S, & Meyer, L. L., (1998). Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-34
analysis.
cooperates and vice versa), women were significantly less cooperative than men. Research 
that restricted participants’ communication and used abstract negotiation simulations showed 
a decreased difference in gender-specific behavior compared to face-to-face simulations.  
 The structural setup of a negotiation, for example if a cooperative or competitive 
strategy yield the best result for a specific negotiation, is found to affect gender specific 
behavior, making it difficult to generalize gender inclinations across negotiations. Low levels 
of interaction in a negotiation is found to have moderating effects on differences in 
cooperativeness between the genders. In summation, previous research on cooperativeness in 
negotiations is inconclusive, but a majority of the studies suggests that women are the more 
cooperative gender.  
!
2.2 Fairness preferences  
 A public good experiment devised by Fehr, Fishbacher and Gäschter, which 
influenced the decision situation in this article, made the participants specify in advance their 
own contribution to the public good for each theoretically possible average contribution of 
the group.  Each group was made up of four individuals who each had to decide how to 35
spend 20 tokens. The decision was between investing the tokens in a public good project or 
keeping the tokens for your own direct payoff. The groups were generated at random, without 
accounting for gender. Thus, the authors did not measure gender effects on the degree of 
cooperation and were unable to account for discrimination, but they found interesting general 
results for the whole population. The experiment was designed so that the predicted outcome 
according to standard theory was complete free riding, assuming rational and selfish 
individuals. However, data collected from the experiment showed that around 50 percent of 
the participants were in fact conditional cooperators, as their contribution to the group 
increased as the group members´ average contribution increased and vice versa. Only one-
third of the participants in the tests were free riding. As seen in figure 1, most conditional 
cooperators in the experiment showed a self-serving bias as they contributed less to the 
common good than others did on average.  The authors explain the motivation for 36
conditional cooperation as a result of preferences for fairness.   
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Goods Experiment
 Ibid. p. 1236
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 The ultimatum game, in which two participants are to divide a predetermined amount 
of money, is commonly used to experimentally demonstrate fairness preferences in bargain 
behavior in negotiations. The participants are given a role of either the proposer or the 
responder. The proposer is to give one proposal on how to divide the money with the 
responder. It is up to the responder to agree and receive the proposed amount of money, or to 
refuse the offer and receive nothing. If the responder accepts the offer, the proposer will 
receive the remaining amount, but if the offer is refused, both participants will instead receive 
nothing. The result in this game is that when offered less than 30 percent the responder is 
very likely to reject the offer, as he/she would rather receive nothing than receive a small 
portion, given the perception of being unfairly treated (the results change only marginally 
when the amount increases to sums as high as two months salary).  This contradicts the 37
notion of self-interest maximizing behavior. The dominantly observed behavior of negative 
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 Fehr, E. & Gächter, S, (2000). Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, p. 16137
Figure 1. The above graph shows the classified decision behavior of the participants in Fehr, Fishbacher and 
Gächter’s (2000) study “Are People Conditionally Cooperative?”. Three distinct behavioral patterns was 
observed; Conditional cooperation, Free riding and “hump-shaped”. 	  
reciprocity (a reciprocal preference that makes the decision-maker willing to cooperate only 
on equal or less stringent conditions than his partner) is arguably caused by some fairness-
induced mechanism that hinders cooperation (see for example Rabin (1993), Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)). , ,  Andreoni and Vesterlund 38 39 40
(2001) found gender differences in altruism by modifying a dictator game for varying prices 
and incomes. Women were more inclined to altruism when it was expensive, and men were 
more inclined to altruism when it was inexpensive. Women had a higher focus on equality 
whereas men were more sensitive to price changes.   41
 In sum, there seems to be a literature gap regarding research on gender differences in 
terms of fairness, in variable sum games. Findings for fixed sum games suggest that women 
are more egalitarian, give more when it is costly, and give less when it is inexpensive, 
compared to men. One aim with this study was to expand on these findings by exploring the 
subject in a variable sum matrix game, with various degrees of cooperation.  
!
2.3 Discrimination  
  Holm (1998) found, through cooperation and coordination “battle of the 
sexes” experiments, that women were discriminated against in favor of men by both sexes.  42
Through a series of ultimatum games, Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) found that men 
received between 13-17% more than women and less was demanded of them by both sexes. 
However, the authors did not find any difference in how women and men discriminate.  The 43
perception about the partner participant willingness to cooperate, play a potentially big role in 
decisions in ultimatum games, but the general conclusion is that in fixed sum games, both 
sexes seem to discriminate women. This study was designed to test if gender discrimination 
is present in more complex variable sum matrix games as well. 
!
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 Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics.38
 Fehr, E. & Gächter, S, (2000). Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity.39
 Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity.40
 Andreoni, J. & Vesterlund, L. (2001). Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism.41
 Holm, H. J., (1998). Gender-Based Focal Points42
 Solnick, S.J., Schweitzer, M. E., (1999). The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum 43
Game Decisions.
2.4 Risk propensity  
 A subject´s propensity to take risks might be affected by both mechanisms influencing 
risk attitude and by mechanisms influencing beliefs about one´s own relative ability. Whereas 
risk attitude describes one´s relative willingness to take an accurately measured risk, beliefs 
about one´s own relative ability play a role in the risk assessment. This study does not aim to 
examine the mechanisms affecting risk propensity, but only to test if gender specific 
differences in risk propensity exist. Previous economics literature on beliefs about subjects 
own relative ability, suggest that men overvalue their ability, and would thus be prone to 
make a decision that is more risky than what it is believed to be. Women were found to 
relatively undervalue their ability, and would thus be prone to make a decision that is less 
risky than believed (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007, Kamas & Preston, 2009, and Niederle et al. 
2010). , ,  Eckel and Grossman (2008) found, by examining experimental economics 44 45 46
studies, that in an experimental setting women are more risk averse than men.  Croson & 47
Gneezy (2009) made similar findings when exploring gender differences in risk taking.  48
Byrnes et al. (1999) meta-analysis of psychology studies on the subject did not reach a clear 
conclusion, as some psychology studies had found women more risk averse, whiles others did 
not find significant gender differences in risk attitudes.  Summarizing previous studies on 49
the topics of gender differences in risk attitudes and gender differences in beliefs, especially 
in settings involving economic instruments, women appear to be less prone to take risks than 
men.   
!
!
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 Niederle M, Vesterlund L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much?44
 Kamas L, Preston A. (2009). Social preferences, competitiveness and compensation: Are there gender 45
differences?
 Niederle M, Segal C, Vesterlund L. (2010). How costly is diversity? Affirmative action in light of gender 46
differences in competitiveness.
 Eckel CC, Grossman PJ. (2008). Men, women, and risk aversion: experimental evidence. In Handbook of 47
Experimental Economics Results, ed. CR Plott, VL Smith, pp. 1061–73.
 Croson R, Gneezy U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. J. Econ. Lit. 47(2):1–2748
 Byrnes JP, Miller DC, Schafer WD. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 49
75:367–83
2.5 Sex stereotyping 
 Previous studies on gender and cooperativeness have found that stereotypes of the 
competitive man and cooperative woman are deeply rooted in our collective consciousness 
(Pruitt et al, 1986; Stamato, 1992; Watson, 1994). , , ,  In a negotiation experiment based 50 51 52 53
on a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants were more than three times as likely to guess that 
the opponent was a man rather than a woman when faced with a competitive strategy (King, 
Miles, & Kniska, 1991).  When participants in an experiment were made to believe that they 54
were negotiating with a woman, although negotiating with a computer program, they saw her 
as more cooperative than when they thought the same computer program was a man 
(Matheson, 1991).  From that observation, it is inferred that the mere awareness of sex-role 55
stereotypes brings forth stereotype confirming behavior in negotiations and the expectations 
on the negotiating behavior they create.  In an experiment by Kray et al. (2001), when the 56
negotiation was framed as diagnostic of ability and characteristics linked to gender, men 
outperformed women.  This finding was explained by stereotype reactance.  Awareness of 57 58
stereotypes makes people expect stereotypical behavior that are in turn confirmed in our mind 
by confirmation bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974).   59
 Conclusions from negotiation experiments show that gender creates expectations on 
the negotiating partner’s behavior, and that these expectations of sex stereotypes induce a 
reactance behavior in the stereotype holder, that might affect negotiation outcomes. While 
studies on sex stereotyping of competitiveness are plenty, there seems to be a deficit of 
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 Matheson, K. (1991). Social cues in computer-mediated negotiations: Gender makes a difference.50
 Pruitt, D. G., Carnevale, P. J. D., Forcey, B. & Van Slyck, M. V. (1986). Gender effects in negotiation: 51
Constituent surveillance and contentious behavior.
 Stamato, L. (1992). Voice, place, and process: Research on gender, negotiation, and conflict resolution.52
 Watson, C. (1994). Gender versus power as a predictor of negotiation behavior and outcomes.53
 King, W. C., Miles, E. W., & Kniska, J. (1991). Boys will be boys (and girls will be girls): The attribution of 54
gender role stereotypes in a gaming situation
 Matheson, K. (1991). Social cues in computer-mediated negotiations: Gender makes a difference.55
 Ibid.56
 Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., Galinsky, A., (2001). Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and 57
Reactance in Negotiations
 Ibid.58
 Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1974). Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases59
studies explicitly examining sex stereotyping of risk attitudes. As a consequence, this study 
was designed to examine sex stereotyping of risk attitudes in a matrix game. To create a 
hypothesis about the outcome of the test, sex stereotyping of competitiveness was used as a 
proxy for stereotyping of risk attitudes.  
 A theoretical explanation of the study, along with hypotheses and expected results, 
will be given in the next section. !
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3. Theory 
 Compared to a case-based negotiation game, an experiment in which participants play 
a matrix game may seem far removed from a real negotiation. However, the underlying traits, 
decisions and assumptions characteristic of a negotiation remain the same for both, and 
matrix games make for a more pure extraction of the variables in this analysis: gender effects 
on cooperation, fairness and discrimination in a negotiation, as well as gender-based 
propensity for risk taking and sex stereotyping. 
!
3.1 Theoretical specification 
 The matrix game called the Prisoners’ Dilemma recreates the main conflict in variable 
sum negotiations, a classification where almost all negotiations land according to the leading 
modern negotiation doctrine (Fisher et al, 1991).  The main conflict in a variable sum 60
negotiation is the opportunity to jointly expand the pie (benefitting all parties), while running 
the risk of being exploited by the other participant. The classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
with two suspected criminals, held in separate interrogation on insubstantial evidence, is 
shown below. 
!
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 The Nash equilibrium is a theoretical solution concept for non-cooperative games in 
which players are assumed to take into account the decision of the other players. The Nash 
equilibrium solution is a state of a game were no player can improve their position by 
changing their strategy, given the strategy of the opposing player. Here, the decision to betray 
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 Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: negotiating Agreement Without Giving In60
Table 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma B: stays silent (cooperates) B: betrays (competes)
A: stays silent (cooperates) Each serves 1 year
A: serve 3 years  
B: goes free
A: betrays (competes)
A: goes free 
B: serve 3 years
Each serves 2 years
is considered the competitive strategy and staying silent is the cooperative strategy. The Nash 
equilibrium in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game is that both participants play the competitive 
strategy and end up with a suboptimal outcome by serving two years. The game in this 
research was designed as a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but with variable degrees of 
cooperation. It was played with the strategy method with a monetary incentive and 
constructed so that the predicted outcome according to standard theory is complete free 
riding. The strategy method makes the participants reflect about all possible strategic choices 
and decide their level of cooperation in advance for each level of cooperation of the other 
negotiator. The experimental game was inspired by a Common Good game, devised by Fehr, 
Fishbacher and Gäschter (2000) (discussed in section 2.2) and it is meant to capture women’s 
and men’s propensity for cooperation, fairness, discrimination, risk taking and sex 
stereotyping.  61
 The strategic structure of the game can be considered as follows: A random 
mechanism chooses one player to make his/her investment decision (in a natural setting, 
someone has to go first; in this experiment, the starting player is randomly selected). This 
decision is labeled “Unconditional investment” in the experiment, and is meant to elicit the 
participants’ propensity for risks. In a natural setting the second player learns the investment 
of the first player, and then the second player decides how much to invest in the common 
project. In theory, as the game is played with the strategy method, the second player does not 
learn the unconditional investment of the other player but decides in advance how much to 
invest conditioned on all the potential unconditional investment of the other player. This 
decision is labeled “Conditional investment” in the experiment and is meant to elicit the 
participants level of cooperation. In the experiment, both players make both the decisions 
first and then the random mechanism decides which is the payoff relevant decision. 
 Under standard theory, assuming fully rational and fully selfish players, an investment 
of zero tokens (complete free riding) by the randomly chosen player, independent of the 
decision of the other player, is the predicted outcome. Therefore, when the game is played 
with the strategy method, all conditional investments (0-10) ought to be zero by rational and 
selfish players. Assuming that the other player understands the concept of rationality and 
selfishness, they, too, are predicted to invest zero in the project to prevent free riding of the 
!17
 Fehr, E., Fishbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2000). Are People Conditional Cooperative? Evidence from a Public 61
Goods Experiment
other participant. To make sure to elicit pure preferences from the participants, the 
participants were told that the game was only played once with the same partner. In this way, 
the experiment was not corrupted by inter-temporal strategic choices. This was to make sure 
that if a participant chose to invest in line with the investment of the other participant, it was 
not due to reputation formation or fear of retaliation, as in a repeated game. In this way, the 
above investment decision can unambiguously be measured as the participant’s inclination to 
be cooperative to a more or lesser extent, or to be competitive. Questions regarding the 
estimated unconditional investment of the other participant in a pair were designed to elicit 
the level of sex stereotyping. The below payoff function for the game (explained in section 
5.1) was presented and explained to the participants prior to playing the game.  
  
 Total income = income from the private account (10 – investments to the project) + 
income from the project (0.8 * sum of the investments to the project). 
  
 Although visually much more complex than the Prisoners’ Dilemma payoff-matrix, 
the payoff-matrix for the game in this research (see table 2) shares the same structure as the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Zero investment by both participants is the Nash equilibrium giving the 
suboptimal payoff of 10 points each. The best aggregated outcome is 32 points, 16 points 
each, expanding the yield by 60% compared to the Nash equilibrium. 18 points is the best 
possible individual score but does only yield an aggregated total of 26 points. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Table 2. Game payoff matrix. 
3.2 Hypothesis and expected results 
 1. Cooperativeness. In line with previous studies on competitiveness and gender 
differences (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Rancer & Baukus, 
1987, Eagly & Johnson, 1990, Walters et al, 1998), women are expected to act slightly more 
cooperatively, in this case, making a slightly higher average conditional investment in the 
common project than men (hypothesis 1.). , , , ,  However the gender effect is expected 62 63 64 65 66
to be moderated by the lack of face-to-face interaction (Walters et. al., 1998).  The effect is 67
expected to be further moderated as, since the seventies and eighties, when the bulk of 
previous studies are from, gender liberalization is expected to have created a higher 
acceptance for gender counter-stereotypic behavior. In total, women are expected to be 
slightly more cooperative than men.  
 2. Fairness preferences. Women are expected to be more egalitarian than men 
(Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), and thus be classified as conditional cooperators, to a 
higher extent than men (hypothesis 2.).   68
 3. Discrimination. Men are expected to receive higher conditional investments, from 
both men and women, in line with findings from ultimatum games (Solnick and Schweitzer, 
1999) and from battle of the sexes games (Holm, 1998). Women are thus expected to be 
discriminated against by both sexes (hypothesis 3.). ,   69 70
 4. Risk attitude. In line with previous studies on risk attitude (Byrnes et al. 1999, 
Eckel & Grossman, 2008 and Croson & Gneezy, 2009), men are expected to invest more in 
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the unconditional investment compared to women, but the difference is expected to be 
moderated by the fact that a higher investment is seen as the less competitive decision 
(hypothesis 4.). , ,  71 72 73
 5. Sex stereotyping. Studies on sex stereotyping of competitiveness (Pruitt et al, 
1986; Matheson, 1991; Stamato, 1992; Watson, 1994) are used as a proxy for hypothesis on 
sex stereotyping of risk attitudes. , , ,  These studies portray a belief about men being 74 75 76 77
more competitive than women. In line with this stereotype, men are expected to be believed 
to be more prone to taking risks and are expected to be believed to invest more in the 
unconditional investment compared to women (hypothesis 5.). 
 The data from the experiment is analyzed in the next section.   
!
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4. Data !
 The experiments in this study were run through a tailored Google Docs online 
application to collect data based on decisions from 113 participants from 24 countries, 
between the ages of 18 and 65. 49 females and 64 males participated. The most represented 
nationality was Swedish with 38 percent (14 female, 29 male). The age group between 21 and 
30 had the highest representation with 87 percent of the participants belonging to it (43 
female, 55 male). 86 percent of the participants were professionals (39 female, 58 male) and 
12 percent were students (9 female, 5 male) (see table 3). This is unusual for a Behavioral 
Economics study, which tend to consist of 1st or 2nd year university students.  75 percent of 78
the participants were young professionals at or below 30 (33 female, 52 male). 63 percent of 
the participants held a postgraduate education (23 female, 48 male). Of the postgraduate 
degrees, 60 percent were in Business Economics or Finance (15 female, 27 male), which had 
the highest representation.	
 	

	
 	

	
   
!
!
!
!
!
!
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4.1. Behavioral classification 
 The participants’ decisions showed two distinctly unified behavioral patterns. The 
patterns were classified into categories: a) conditional cooperation i.e. investment correlated, 
at the 1-percent confidence level, to the investment of the partner participant; b) free riding 
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   No. of participants: 113 
	 Female: 49  
	 Male: 64   
Origin of participants: 24 nationalities 
Professionals: 97 
Students: 14
Table 3. Participant statistics	

Age <20 4
Age 21-30 98
Age 31-40 6
Age 41-50 1
Age 51-60 3
Age 61-70 1
i.e. not investing at all; and c) “other”, where the majority of investment decisions best can be 
described as random. 
 Conditional cooperation. The participant’s investments for this category are 
correlated at the 1-percent confidence level, to the investment of the partner participant.  79
63% of female to female investments, 59% of female to male investments, 56% of male to 
female investments, and 59% of male to male investments, belong to this category. This is in 
line with previous studies, but in the higher range (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Falk 
and Gächter, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999). , ,  14% of the male participants' investments in 80 81 82
this category, and 17% female participants' investments in this category, were perfectly 
conditionally cooperative, meaning exactly matching the investment of the partner 
participant.   
 Free riding. Participants in this category gave a 0 investment regardless of the 
investment of the partner participant. This is a strictly rational and selfish behavior in the 
description and prediction of classic theory. 8% of female to female investments, 6% of 
female to male investments, 14% of male to female investments, and 14% of male to male 
investments, belong to this category. This is lower compared to previous studies, where about 
30% of subjects fall into this category (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Falk and Gächter, 
1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999).   83
 Other. Participant's investments falling into this category showed no significantly 
distinct unified pattern. Most investment decisions falling into this category can best be 
described as random. However, one male participant made a unilateral investment — 
contributing fully no matter the partner participant’s investment. Two male participants and 
two female participants made investments negatively correlated, to the 1-percent level, to the 
partner participant. Two male participants invested correlated to the partner participant for 
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low investment levels but reversed this behavior and contributed negatively correlated to the 
partner participant for higher investment levels, creating a hump shaped investment pattern. 
!
!
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Table 4. Classification composition  
Investment Classification 
By To Conditional cooperator Free rider Other
Female
Female 63% 8% 29%
Male 59% 6% 35%
Male
Female 56% 14% 30%
Male 59% 14% 27%
5. Method  
The decision situation that the matrix game in this experiment is based on is a variant 
of a standard linear public goods game (see Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr, 2000).  The game 84
is played with only two players to elicit gender effects from the participants’ decision 
making. In this way, the structure is one of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game with variable degrees 
of cooperation. The participants were recruited through a personal FaceBook invitation. 
Actual payoff occurred to only 5% of the participants. 
!
5.1 Game design  
 Every participant played the game two times, first against a woman and then against a 
man. The partnering participant’s gender in the pair was the only characteristic known to the 
participants and there was no communication between the participants. The game was only 
played once in each pair to extract the inclinations free from inter-temporal strategy 
contemplation. This creates an environment where the participants are not affected by future 
reputation and retribution, or other concerns related to iterated games. 
 Each participant in a pair was tasked with deciding how to spend ten tokens. The 
participant could either keep these tokens on a private account, or make the decision to invest 
them fully or partially into a common project. The following payoff function was explained 
to the participants of the experiment:  
  
 Total income = income from the private account (10 – investments to the project) + 
income from the project (0.8 * sum of the investments to the project). 
!
 The participants were informed that each token put on the private account would earn 
them exactly one point, and that they would earn points to a value of 80% of the sum of the 
total tokens invested in the project. The investment decision was clearly explained to the 
participants in the instructions to the experiment. The participants were thereafter provided 
examples of decisions and their respective outcome to make sure the participants fully 
understood the mechanisms of the payoff function. The decision situation consisted of two 
!24
 Fehr, E., Fishbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2000). Are People Conditional Cooperative? Evidence from a Public 84
Goods Experiment
types of decisions. The first was a decision on an unconditional investment from 0 to 10 to 
the project. The second was a decision on investments conditioned on the other participant in 
the pair, like this: How much would you like to invest in the common project if the other 
participant contributes 0, 1, 2, 3, etc., up to 10? The decisions of the other participant in the 
pair were unknown while the decision-making was made. To make sure both decisions were 
taken equally seriously, the participants were told that only one of the two types of decisions 
were going to be the payoff relevant decision. Which one would be the payoff relevant 
decision would be chosen randomly after both decision types were made.  
 Top scoring participants would have the chance to receive their payoff in their home 
country currency, converted at the following rate:  
   1 point = SEK 20 / €2 / $3 / £2 / HK $20.  
 The participants were told to make conditional decisions for every possible 
information set, instead of making actual choices. This game structure is called the strategy 
method. It differs from the, in matrix games, more commonly used direct response method, 
where the participant knows the decision of the other participant and then decide on a 
response.  
  
5.2 Limitations 
 The most obvious limitation of using a matrix game and the strategy method to 
simulate real world negotiations is the lack of communication, thus missing the components 
of coordination and persuasion. However, for the purpose of this research, blocking the noise 
of explicit bargaining will make elicit gender-based preferences a more precise matter, 
leading to more certain results. In a game theoretic view, the use of a strategic form game 
instead of an extensive form game should not affect the participant’s decisions and thus the 
outcome of the game. However, asking the participants to reflect about all possible strategic 
choices in advance might make them think about the game differently, and in a more rational 
way. This might change the outcome of a game compared to the same game played with 
sequential decisions under the direct response method. But looking at empirical evidence 
comparing the outcome of studies using the strategy method compared to the direct response 
method, it does not seem as though the results differ (Casari & Cason, 2009 and Brandts and 
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Charness, 2010). ,   85 86
 The small budget did not allow for promise of payoff to all participants, which could 
have altered the results; however, this could be assumed to effect both genders approximately 
equally. Perhaps the lower than anticipated amount of free riding was an effect of this. 
However, it should not have affected the gender comparison.  
 The fact that the experiment was conducted in the same order for all participants, first 
negotiation with a woman and then negotiation with a man, could potentially have mitigating 
effects on discrimination. However, it could be assumed to affect both gender equally and 
should thus, at least, not affect the comparison between the gender.  
 The invitations to the experiment was sent out on FaceBook to contacts of the author. 
The 23 percent of invites that decided to participate may have done so driven by altruism or 
warm glow, and thus potentially be composed of a higher proportion of altruistic people and a 
lower proportion of selfish people, compared to the average population. This could have 
effects on the results towards more cooperation and less free riding, compared to previous 
studies. But it is not expected to affect the genders differently, and should thus not interfere 
with the  gender comparison. 
 Framing the conditional investment decision as an investment could potentially make 
participants believe it risky, overlooking the fact that the decision is completely isolated from 
risk. This could potentially lead risk averse participants to invest less in the conditional 
investment, compared to if the decision was fully understood. However, 71 percent of the 
female participants and 80 percent of the male participants read clarifying example decisions, 
detailing outcomes for different decision scenarios, in addition to the experiment instructions. 
 See appendix 9.1 for the instructions to the experiment, including the clarifying 
examples. 
!!
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6. Results 
 Data was collected through the experiment for the conditional investment decisions, 
for the unconditional investment decision and for beliefs about males´ and females´ 
unconditional investments. The data for the conditional investment decisions were meant to 
capture if significant differences in gender specific inclination for cooperation exist. This data 
set was also categorized according to behavior (Conditional cooperator, Free rider and 
Other), in order to analyze if significant differences in categorization composition exist 
between the genders. The focus of the categorization was on the Conditional cooperator 
category, as that category was seen as eliciting a preference for fairness. The data for the 
unconditional investment was captured to examine if significant gender differences in 
propensity for risks exist. The belief data on the unconditional investment was captured to 
check potential differences in sex stereotyping.  
 Significance for differences between the sexes in level of cooperation was tested with 
the two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test. To test significance for differences in discrimination, 
the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used. The Chi2 test was used to test if 
significant differences in categorization composition exist between the genders. 
!
6.1 Conditional investment 
 The data for the conditional investment decisions were tested for significance as the 
average investment per individual, to determine propensity for cooperation. In addition, the 
data sets for 0, 1, 2 , etc., up to 10 were tested to see if significant differences in cooperation 
were present for different levels of stakes. The total female and male populations were tested 
both for differences in level of cooperation and in discrimination. Neither test using the 
conditional investment data set showed any significant differences between the genders. In 
summation, there was no significant discrimination by either of the genders.  
!
!
  
!27
 !28
Condi&onal	  Investment,	  female	  to	  male
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Condi&onal	  Investment,	  male	  to	  female
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Condi&onal	  Investment,	  female	  to	  female
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Condi&onal	  Investment,	  male	  to	  male
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Graph 2. Female recipients are shown at the top, and male recipients are shown below. Women as a whole 
contributed on average slightly less than men for low amounts and slightly more on average for high 
amounts, towards both sexes. In the conditional cooperation group, women contributed on average slightly 
less than men, towards both sexes. However in the “other” group, women contributed on average slightly 
more than men, towards both sexes. Neither of the results were significant.	  
Table 5. Conditional Investment Average 
Conditional Investment Average
By Total Average To Total Free rider
Conditional 
cooperator Other
Female 4.30
Female 4.37 0 4.74 4.82
Male 4.22 0 4.55 4.39
Male 4.30
Female 4.32 0 5.69 3.78
Male 4.27 0 5.33 4.17
6.2 Categorization composition 
 No significant differences in classification of behavior towards the different genders 
(discrimination) were found. Neither were there any significant differences in the 
composition of classifications (conditional investment, free rider, other) between the genders. 
However, a small, statistically non-significant, number of participants behaved in such a 
discriminating way that their behavior was in line with one categorization towards female 
participants and another categorization towards male participants.  
!
6.3 Unconditional investment 
 The Unconditional Investment was a specified investment amount for an unspecified 
counter investment by the partner participant. It was designed to elicit risk propensity. Male 
participants invested 24 percent more to female participants, than what female participants 
invested to other female participants (5.50 points compared to 4.43 points), (P-value: 0.034) 
significant at 95% confidence level. Male participants invested 25 percent more to other male 
participants, than what female participants invested to male participants (5.70 points 
compared to 4.55 points), (P-value: 0.044) significant at 95% confidence level. There were 
no significant differences in how males invested to males, compared to how they invested to 
females. The same goes for female participants' behavior. In summation, male participants 
invested significantly more to both sexes than what female participants did.   
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Unconditional Investment
By Total Average To Total
Female 4.49
Female 4.43
Male 4.55
Male 5.60
Female 5.50
Male 5.70
Table 6. Unconditional Investment 
6.4 Beliefs unconditional investment  
 Men believed that male participants would invest significantly more than female 
participants (P-value: 0.046), 12 percent or 5.30 compared to 4.75, significant at 95% 
confidence level. Women also believed that male participants would invest significantly more 
than female participants (P-value: 0.046), 16,5 percent or 5.30 compared to 4.55, significant 
at 95% confidence level. However, there was no significant difference between the sexes in 
their belief about the investments.  
 
!
!
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Table 7. Beliefs Unconditional investment  
Beliefs Unconditional Investment
Of About Total
Female 
Female 4.55
Male 5.30
Male
Female 4.75
Male 5.30
7. Conclusions   
 This study was meant to explore possible underlying gender-specific inclinations, 
fundamental to negotiation outcomes. Gender-based tendencies for: cooperation, fairness, 
discrimination, risk taking, and sex stereotyping. The study was not meant to explore gender-
based negotiator effectiveness or performance. The below questions were posed in order to 
explore these tendencies: 
• Do gender differences in propensity to cooperate exist? 
• Do gender differences in fairness preferences exist?  
• Do gender-based tendencies to discriminate exist; if so, who is discriminated by whom? 
• Do gender-based differences in risk propensity exist? 
• Do gender-based tendencies to stereotype exist; if so, do women and men hold different sex 
stereotypes? 
!
 Based on previous studies, the below hypothesis were formulated and tested in order 
to address  the above questions. 
1. Women were expected to behave slightly more cooperatively, in this case, investing 
slightly more in the common project than men.  
2. Women were expected to behave more egalitarian, i.e. be classified as conditional 
cooperators to a higher extent than men.  
3. Women were expected to receive lower conditional investments from both women and 
men, and thus be discriminated against by both sexes. 
4. Men were expected to take higher risk and invest more in the unconditional investment 
compared to women. 
5. Men were expected to be believed to be more prone to risks and thus believed to invest 
more in the unconditional investment compared to women. 
  
 The results from the tests showed that:  
• There were no differences in level of cooperation between the sexes, as no significant 
gender differences for the conditional investment were found. The first hypothesis was thus 
rejected.  
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• Neither were women more egalitarian as there was no significant gender difference in 
conditional cooperation classification. The second hypothesis was thus also rejected.  
• There was no significant discrimination of or by either of the sexes, for any of the 
investment decisions. The third hypothesis was thus rejected. 
• Men were found to be more prone to taking risks than women, and invested significantly 
more in the risky unconditional investment, compared to women, to both women and men. 
The fourth hypothesis was thus accepted. 
• Both female- and male participants believed that men would take higher risks and invest 
significantly more in the unconditional investment than women would. The fifth hypothesis 
was thus accepted. 
 A tentative interpretation of the results could be that gender differences in propensity 
to take risks may help men to achieve better results in negotiations in organizational life, as 
men would be more inclined to; take higher risks in negotiations and be more inclined to 
enter risky negotiations, thereby ultimately more likely to enter riskier positions and fields 
with higher rewards, than women would be. The mere sex stereotype of differences in risk 
propensity could potentially elevate this effect by stereotype reactance.  
 Further theoretical research regarding risk propensity and negotiation success, 
together with empirical research regarding possible gender differences in: frequency to apply 
for a new job; frequency to initiate salary negotiations; tendency to quit current job to search 
for a new one; tendency to apply for a higher level position (a more risky position), could 
possibly confirm if risk propensity and stereotypes of risk attitudes play a role in the wage 
gap and in the glass ceiling phenomena. If differences in risk propensity and stereotypes of 
risk attitudes do indeed prove to have an effect on the observed gender inequality in 
organizational life, then policies to lower the risk of becoming, and being unemployed (for 
example barriers to fire people and unemployment benefits), together with policies to lower 
the risk of initiating a salary negotiation (for example mandatory yearly salary negotiations), 
would potentially contribute to increased gender equality in organizational life. 
!
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9. Appendix 
!
9.1 The investment decision experiment  
The below was presented to the participants of the experiment through a tailored 
Google Docs online application.  All participants played the game two times, once with a 87
female participant and once with a male participant. 
!
Investment decision experiment 
!
Thank you for taking part in this economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and chance, earn a considerable 
amount of money in relation to the time you spend. It is therefore important that you read 
these instructions with care. The monetary incentive is meant to make sure that every 
participant will do his or her best in the experiment. Please take your time to think the 
decisions through, but do not dwell on the decisions too long. Estimated time is 20 min. 
During the experiment, different currencies will not be discussed but rather points, as your 
entire earnings will be calculated in points. Randomly selected participants that score in the 
top half will receive their earnings in their home country currency, converted at the following 
rate:  
1 point = SKr20 / €2 / $3 / £2 / HK$20.  
!
Please start by filling out your personal information below. 
Your name will not be disclosed and your personal information will be treated 
confidentially. 
!
!
Participant information 
!
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 Link to the experiment: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?87
usp=drive_web&formkey=dDdCNXIyLTM5bFJqVTk2OUVkeF9EU2c6MQ#gid=0
Name: ___________________________________________ 
!
Gender:  
!  Female   
!  Male   
!
Age:  
!  20 and younger   
!  21-30                  
!  31-40 
!  41-50 
!  51-60 
!  61-70 
!
Field of study/Occupation: ___________________________ 
!
Nationality: _______________________________________ 
!
!
Experimental instructions 
!
The decision situation 
You are a participant in a pair of two people. Except the experimenters, nobody 
knows exactly who is in which pair. However, you will learn the gender of the participant that 
you will be matched with before your make your investment decision. Each participant has to 
decide on the investment of 10 tokens that can be invested fully or partially into a project, or 
saved for you on a private account. Each token you do not invest into the project will 
automatically be transferred to your private account. 
!
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Your income from the private account 
For each token you put on your private account you will earn exactly one point. For 
example, if you put ten tokens onto your private account (which implies that you do not 
invest anything into the project) you will earn exactly ten tokens from the private account. 
Nobody except you earns anything from your private account.  
!
Your income from the project 
From the token amount you invest into the project each participant will get the same 
payoff. You will also get a payoff from the tokens the other participant invests into the 
project. For each participant the income from the project will be determined as follows:  
!
  Income from the project = sum of the investments to the project * 0.8. 
  
For example, if the sum of the investment to the project is 15 tokens, then you and the 
other participant will get a payoff of 15 * 0.8 = 12 points each from the project.  
!
Your total income 
Your total income results from the summation of your income from the private 
account and your income from the project. 
!
Total income = income from the private account (10 – investments to the project) + 
income from the project (0.8 * sum of the investments to the project). 
!
The Experiment 
The experiment contains the decision situations that have just been described to you. 
If randomly selected and scoring in the top half, you will get paid according to the decisions 
you make in this experiment.  
As you know you will have 10 tokens at your disposal. You can put them into a 
private account or you can invest them into a project. In this experiment each subject has to 
make two types of decisions. In the following they will be called “unconditional investment” 
and “conditional investment”. 
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!
• With the unconditional investment to the project you have to decide how many 
of the 10 tokens you want to invest in the project unconditionally.  
!
• Your second task is to fill out your conditional investments. Here you have to 
indicate for each possible investment of the other participant how many tokens 
you want to invest in the project. You can condition your investment on the 
investment of the other participant.  
!
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional investment and 
have filled out their conditional investment, in each pair a random mechanism will select one 
participant. For the randomly determined participant only the conditional investments will be 
the payoff-relevant decision. For the participant that is not selected, only the unconditional 
investment will be the payoff-relevant decision. Two examples at the end of the document 
should make this clear. If you already are sure that you comprehend the experiment then you 
may please start to indicate your investments to the project below. Otherwise, please read the 
two examples at the end of the document.  
!
Unconditional Investment 
Please indicate your unconditional investment in the project in integral numbers  
(0-10): !  
!
Conditional Investment 
  The numbers next to the input boxes indicate possible investments of the other 
participant in the project. Please simply insert into each box how many tokens you will invest 
in the project – conditional on the indicated investment of the other participant. You have to 
make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have to indicate how much you 
invest in the project if the other participant invests 0, 1, or 2 tokens etc. In each input box you 
can insert all integer numbers from 0 to 10.  
  
Please indicate your conditional investment in the project below 
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!
0 !   1 !   2 !   3 !   4 !   5 !   6 !   7 !   8 !   9 !   10 !  
!
!
Motivational Questions 
!
Please indicate in integral numbers what you think is the average unconditional 
investment of male participants? (0-10): !  
!
Please indicate in integral numbers what you think is the average unconditional 
investment of female participants? (0-10): !  
!
When you made your investment decisions, did you regard how your decisions might 
affect your partner’s outcome? 
!  Yes  
!  No  
!
When you made your investment decisions, was your strategy to maximize your own 
total points?  
!  Yes  
!  No  
!
When you made your investment decisions, did you take into account the gender of 
your partner? 
!  Yes  
!  No  
!
!
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Optional Clarifying Examples 
!
Please indicate below if you read the examples.  
   
 Example 1: Assume that you have been selected by the random mechanism. This 
implies that your relevant decision will be your conditional investments. For the other 
participant the unconditional investment is the relevant decision. Assume the other 
participant have made an unconditional investment of 2 tokens. If you have indicated 
in your conditional investment that you will invest 1 token if the other participant 
invests 2 tokens, then the total investment in the project is given by 2 + 1 = 3 tokens. 
Both participants therefore, earn 0.8 x 3 = 2.4 points from the project plus their 
respective income from the private account. If you have instead indicated in your 
conditional investment that you will invest 9 tokens if the other participant invests 2 
tokens, then the total investment to the project is given by 2 + 9 = 11. Both 
participants therefore earn 0.8 x 11 = 8.8 points from the project plus their respective 
income from the private account.  
!
 Example 2: Assume that you have not been selected by the random mechanism, which 
implies that for you the unconditional investment is taken as the payoff-relevant 
decision. Assume your unconditional investment is 8 tokens. If the participant who 
has been selected by the random mechanism indicates in his conditional investment 
that he will invest 2 token if the other participant invest 8 tokens, then the total 
investment to the project is given by 8 + 2 = 10 tokens. Both participants will 
therefore earn 0.8 x 10 = 8 points from the project plus their respective income from 
the private account. If instead the randomly selected participant indicates in his 
conditional investment that he invests 9 tokens if the other participant invests 8 
tokens, then the total investment to the project is 8 + 9 = 17 tokens. Both participants 
will therefore earn 0.8 x 17 = 13.6 points from the project plus their respective income 
from their private account.  
!
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Did you read the optional clarifying examples?  
!  Yes  
!  No  
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